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# Partitioning to Peace

Carter Johnson

## Sovereignty, Demography, and Ethnic Civil Wars

Since the early 1950s, civil wars have been longer lasting and more frequent than international wars, producing high levels of death and disability.<sup>1</sup> Ethnic wars have been especially common, comprising 55 percent (70) to 72 percent (91) of all civil wars between 1945 and 1999.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, cross-national evidence suggests that ethnic wars last longer than nonethnic wars.<sup>3</sup> These numbers are even more troubling given that, during the 1990s, more than 200 ethnic minorities and subordinate majorities throughout the world were contesting their political status.<sup>4</sup> In addition to the challenge of ending civil wars, one of the most vex-

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*Carter Johnson is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Maryland, College Park, where he is writing his dissertation on population migration during and after war. He received his M.Sc. from the London School of Economics and was Visiting Fellow with the Civic Education Project at the University of Uzbekistan and State Pedagogical University of Moldova. He is the former Project Coordinator of the Minorities at Risk Project.*

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1. James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin write, "Between 1945 and 1999, about 3.33 million battle deaths occurred in the 25 interstate wars that killed at least 1,000 and had at least 100 dead on each side. These wars involved just 25 states that suffered casualties of at least 1,000 and had a median duration of not quite 3 months. In contrast, in the same period there were roughly 127 civil wars that killed at least 1,000, 25 of which were ongoing in 1999. A conservative estimate of the total dead as a direct result of these conflicts is 16.2 million, five times the interstate toll. These civil wars occurred in 73 states—more than a third of the United Nations system—and had a median duration of roughly six years." Fearon and Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 97, No. 1 (February 2003), pp. 75–90, at p. 75. The number of ongoing civil wars has declined since its peak in the late 1980s and early 1990s, but it remains high (ranging between 20 and 30 wars since 1993), and recent data show a second upward trend beginning in 2004. See Joseph Hewitt, Jonathan Wilkenfeld, and Ted Robert Gurr, *Peace and Conflict, 2008* (Boulder, Colo.: Paradigm, 2007). For a discussion of the toll of civil wars on civilians, see Hazem Adam Ghobarah, Paul Huth, and Bruce Russett, "Civil Wars Kill and Maim People—Long after the Shooting Stops," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 97, No. 2 (May 2003), pp. 189–202. See also Paul Collier, Lani Elliott, Håvard Hegre, Anke Hoeffler, Marta Reynal-Querol, and Nicholas Sambanis, *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2003).

2. In his study of civil war duration, James D. Fearon codes his cases as "ethnic," "nonethnic," and "ambiguous." Ethnic wars made up 55 percent of all civil wars between 1945 and 1999, and ambiguous wars 17 percent. See Fearon, "Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others?" *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 41, No. 3 (May 2004), pp. 275–301.

3. Roy Licklider, "The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945–1993," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 89, No. 3 (September 1995), pp. 681–690.

4. Ted Robert Gurr, *Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993); and John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary, "Introduc-

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ing problems have been their high recidivism rate, with postconflict countries facing up to a 50 percent chance of experiencing renewed war within the first five years of establishing peace.<sup>5</sup>

Since the mid-1990s, one solution to preventing the recurrence of ethnic civil war that has gained international policy and scholarly attention has been partition.<sup>6</sup> The debate surrounding partition emerged at the end of the Cold War, as ethnic conflicts came to the forefront of Western policymakers' attention and international boundaries were once again open to large-scale change. Still, Western governments have demonstrated a certain ambivalence toward partition. Although they have opposed the recognition of several de facto partitions, such as Nagorno Karabakh in Azerbaijan, they have promoted the incorporation of partitions into the peace plans of Sudan and Papua New Guinea.<sup>7</sup> The negotiations surrounding the final status of Kosovo further reflected Western ambivalence, with the independence of Kosovo from Serbia fiercely contested within the European Union; there is also the possibility of a further partition of Kosovo into majority Albanian and Serbian regions, which is the de facto political composition of independent Kosovo.<sup>8</sup> In addition,

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tion: The Macro-Political Regulation of Ethnic Conflict," in McGarry and O'Leary, eds., *The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation* (London: Routledge, 1993), pp. 1–40.

5. See Paul Collier, Anke Hoefler, and Mans Soderbom, "On the Duration of Civil War," Policy Research Working Paper, No. 2681 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, September 2001); Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis, "Understanding Civil War: A New Agenda," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 46, No. 1 (February 2002), pp. 3–12; and Licklider, "The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars." For other war recurrence statistics, see Barbara F. Walter, "Does Conflict Beget Conflict? Explaining Recurring Civil War," *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 41, No. 3 (May 2004), pp. 371–388.

6. John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary present a taxonomy of macro-political forms of ethnic conflict regulation identifying partition as one of eight. See McGarry and O'Leary, "Introduction"; and Nicholas Mansergh, *The Prelude to Partition: Concepts and Aims in Ireland and India* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978).

7. Sudan's comprehensive peace agreement that ended the war between the Khartoum government and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) included a provision for a referendum on independence for the south. See International Crisis Group, "The Khartoum-SPLM Agreement: Sudan's Uncertain Peace," Africa Report, No. 96 (Brussels: International Crisis Group, July 25, 2005). Similarly, the 2001 peace agreement between Papua New Guinea's government and the separatists in Bougainville included a referendum on independence. See Conciliation Resources, Bougainville Peace Agreement, August 31, 2001, <http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/png-bougainville/key-texts37.php>.

8. On August 28, 2007, the Dutch foreign minister, Maxime Verhagen, became the first European foreign minister to state that partition of Kosovo into majority Albanian and Serb political territories would be an acceptable outcome. This was followed by a similar comment by Sergei Lavrov, Russia's foreign minister, on August 31, 2007. See Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, "Dutch Minister Says Partition of Kosovo Acceptable," *RFE/RL Newslines*, Vol. 11, No. 160, Pt. 2 (August 29, 2007); and "Russia Rules Out Crossing 'Red Line' on Kosovo, but Would Accept Partition," *RFE/RL Newslines*, Vol. 11, No. 163, Pt. 2 (September 4, 2007). As far as I am aware, no state actively lobbied for a further partition of Kosovo, though some had suggested that such an outcome would be acceptable if Kosovo and Serbian leaders accepted this compromise. See Dan Bilefsky, "In a Di-

policymakers have increasingly proposed partition as one way to solve the civil war taking place in Iraq.<sup>9</sup>

Scholarly debate about the relative merits of partition is not new.<sup>10</sup> Since the end of the Cold War, however, the debate over partition has primarily emphasized humanitarian issues. When scholars and policymakers have proposed partition, it has been as a last resort, to end ethnic wars when widespread massacres and forced population transfers have already begun to occur and where long-term military commitments by the international community are either not forthcoming or are unable to produce peace.<sup>11</sup> Partition advocates argue that under these conditions, partitioning groups into separate states where they can protect themselves militarily provides the best chance for ending ethnic wars and establishing an enduring peace. They do not, however, support the blanket application of new borders to solve ethnic civil wars. Rather they argue for the need to separate warring populations—with population transfers where necessary—in an effort to create relatively homogeneous units where ethnic groups' security fears are reduced and demobilization and reconstruction efforts can begin without the need for long-term commitments of international troops.

Studies on the debate over partition have largely remained theoretical or focused on case studies and policy prescriptions.<sup>12</sup> Evidence has pointed to

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vided Kosovo City, a Resounding Vow to Remain Part of Serbia," *New York Times*, February 19, 2008.

9. For suggested partitions of Iraq, see Peter W. Galbraith, "Iraq's Salvation Lies in Letting It Break Apart," *Sunday Times*, July 16, 2006; Chaim Kaufmann, "Separating Iraqis, Saving Iraq," in "What to Do in Iraq: A Roundtable," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 85, No. 4 (July/August 2006), pp. 156–160; and Leslie H. Gelb, "Last Train from Baghdad," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 85, No. 4 (July/August 2006), pp. 160–165. One of the earliest proposals on partition came from Leslie H. Gelb, "The Three-State Solution," *New York Times*, November 25, 2003. See also the symposium "Ethnic Conflict, Ethnic Partition, and U.S. Foreign Policy," sponsored by the Ethics and Public Policy Center, Washington, D.C., January 15, 2003. On September 27, 2007, the U.S. Senate passed a nonbinding measure calling for Iraq to be divided into federal regions, with the likely outcome of separate Kurdish, Shiite, and Sunni states. See Alissa J. Rubin, "In Iraq, Repeated Support for a Unified State," *New York Times*, October 1, 2007.

10. In 1985 Donald L. Horowitz stated, for example, "Separating the antagonists—partition—is an option increasingly recommended for consideration where groups are territorially concentrated." Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), p. 588.

11. Chaim Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Wars," *International Security*, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Spring 1996), pp. 136–175; and Chaim D. Kaufmann, "When All Else Fails: Ethnic Population Transfers and Partitions in the Twentieth Century," *International Security*, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Fall 1998), pp. 120–156. Jaroslav Tir has also suggested that peaceful partitions are extremely unlikely to produce the onset of war. See Tir, "Keeping the Peace after Secession: Territorial Conflicts between Rump and Secessionist States," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 49, No. 5 (October 2005), pp. 713–741. Although Tir's addition to the literature is useful, it does not address the problem of how to prevent the recurrence of civil war.

12. Alexander B. Downes, "The Problem with Negotiated Settlements to Ethnic Civil Wars," *Security Studies*, Vol. 13, No. 4 (Summer 2004), pp. 230–279; John J. Mearsheimer, "The Case for Parti-

some successes, such as the 1974 partition of Cyprus, which led to decades of peace, and some failures, such as the partition of British India, which led to widespread massacres and ultimately resulted in war. This article offers a systematic, cross-national test of all partitions that followed ethnic civil wars between 1945 and 2004. It finds that partition is a uniformly effective tool in preventing a recurrence of war and low-level violence, but only if it includes the physical separation of ethnic groups. This finding challenges that of Nicholas Sambanis, who, in 2000, produced the first empirical study of partition using a large-*n*, cross-national database.<sup>13</sup> Based on his results, Sambanis concluded that “partition does not significantly prevent war recurrence [, which] suggests, at the very least, that separating ethnic groups does not resolve the problem of violent ethnic antagonism.”<sup>14</sup>

Sambanis’s analysis helped to further scholarly understanding of partition’s relationship to the recurrence of conflict, but it did not test the core theoretical argument of partition advocates. The Sambanis analysis suffers from a methodological error because it identified new borders (i.e., sovereignty) as the critical independent variable to represent partition, and not the demographic separation of warring ethnic groups. Testing the relationship between sovereignty and conflict recurrence does not capture, and therefore cannot refute, the position of partition advocates.<sup>15</sup> This article, in contrast, introduces an index to calculate the amount of unmixing of ethnic groups that occurs with partition, therefore capturing partition advocates’ core argument.

The article is divided into six sections. First, I review the theoretical and empirical literature on partition. Second, I examine partition’s empirical record and raise critical questions about Sambanis’s main conclusion that partition is

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tioning Kosovo,” in Ted Galen Carpenter, ed., *NATO’s Empty Victory: A Postmortem on the Balkan War* (Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute, 2000), pp. 133–138; Alexander B. Downes, “The Holy Land Divided: Partition as a Solution to Ethnic Wars,” *Security Studies*, Vol. 10, No. 4 (Summer 2001), pp. 58–116; Kaufmann, “When All Else Fails”; Kaufmann, “Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Wars”; Radha Kumar, *Divide and Fall? Bosnia in the Annals of Partition* (New York: Verso, 1997); Radha Kumar, “The Troubled History of Partition,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 76, No. 1 (January/February 1997), pp. 22–34; Mansergh, *The Prelude to Partition*; Robert Schaeffer, *Warpaths: The Politics of Partition* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1990); Jan Tullberg and Brigitta S. Tullberg, “Separation or Unity? A Model for Solving Ethnic Conflicts,” *Politics and the Life Sciences*, Vol. 16, No. 2 (September 1997), pp. 237–248; John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen Van Evera, “When Peace Means War: The Partition That Dare Not Speak Its Name,” *New Republic*, December 18, 1995, pp. 16–21; John J. Mearsheimer and Robert A. Pape, “The Answer: A Partition Plan for Bosnia,” *New Republic*, June 14, 1993, pp. 22–28; and Peter W. Galbraith, *The End of Iraq: How American Incompetence Created a War without End* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006).

13. Nicholas Sambanis, “Partition as a Solution to Ethnic War: An Empirical Critique of the Theoretical Literature,” *World Politics*, Vol. 52, No. 4 (July 2000), pp. 437–483, at p. 479.

14. Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 479.

15. Alexander Downes notes this flaw in the Sambanis analysis in Downes, “The Holy Land Divided.”

not particularly effective at preventing war recurrence. Third, I propose an alternative variable—the Postpartition Ethnic Homogeneity Index (PEHI)—for testing whether partition is a viable solution for ending ethnic wars. Fourth, I demonstrate that, where the index shows warring ethnic groups were in fact separated, neither war nor low-level violence reoccurred for at least five years, suggesting that partition advocates are correct. Fifth, I compare complete partitions with both incomplete partitions and other forms of ethnic war termination, such as government victory. Sixth, I discuss some of the policy implications that follow from the analysis, in particular for the final status of Kosovo and proposals to partition Iraq.

### *Partition as a Means to End Civil Wars*

Since the mid-1990s, scholars have produced a number of theoretical and empirical studies on how civil wars end and how to create an enduring peace. Factors that can influence the termination of civil wars and help to prevent their recurrence include the length or cost of the war, the ability of a central government to make credible commitments, the presence of mediators, the strength of state security forces, and a willingness to address grievances.<sup>16</sup>

In cases where long-term military commitments by the international community are not forthcoming or do not establish interethnic peace, some scholars have suggested partition.<sup>17</sup> Further, given the high percentage of civil wars

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16. Licklider, "The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars"; T. David Mason and Patrick J. Fett, "How Civil Wars End: A Rational Choice Approach," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 40, No. 4 (December 1996), pp. 546–568; T. David Mason, Joseph P. Weingarten Jr., and Patrick J. Fett, "Win, Lose, or Draw: Predicting the Outcome of Civil Wars," *Political Research Quarterly*, Vol. 52, No. 2 (June 1999), pp. 239–268; Barbara F. Walter, *Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002); and Barbara F. Walter and Jack Snyder, eds., *Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999). Walter examines the difficulty of states in credibly committing to peaceful coexistence with rebel organizations after war, as it applies to all civil wars. See Walter, *Committing to Peace*. For a discussion of the commitment problem as it applies to ethnic conflicts in particular, see James D. Fearon, "Commitment Problems and the Spread of Ethnic Conflict," in David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, eds., *The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998), pp. 107–126. For grievance-based arguments of ethnic minorities, see Ted Robert Gurr, *Peoples versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2000). For a focus on individual motivations for joining rebel forces and reducing these motivations, see Walter, "Does Conflict Beget Conflict?" For the relationship between security force strength and civil war, see Jeffrey Herbst, "African Militaries and Rebellion: The Political Economy of Threat and Combat Effectiveness," *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 41, No. 3 (May 2004), pp. 357–369, at p. 358. Although Herbst does not explicitly claim to focus on war recurrence, the countries within his regional focus of Africa have experienced renewed warfare, and therefore his conclusions about the need to strengthen state security forces to prevent civil war are relevant to this debate.

17. Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Wars"; and Kaufmann, "When All Else Fails."



that recur within the first five years of the establishment of peace, advocates of partition argue that it may be the best way to bring about an enduring solution to at least some kinds of intractable ethnic conflicts.<sup>18</sup>

Partition theory rests on two primary principles. First, ethnic civil wars are qualitatively different from other kinds of civil war. Second, warring ethnic groups confront a security dilemma that prevents them from de-escalating and demobilizing. As a result, ethnic groups must be separated and given sovereignty to produce long-term peace.

#### ETHNIC CIVIL WARS

In the social science literature, “ethnic conflict” refers to conflicts involving ascriptive group identities, identities that are very difficult, if not impossible, to change and that are often based on an individual’s descent (e.g., language, religion, or race).<sup>19</sup> Wars involving groups with different communal identities (e.g., Sunni and Shiite Arabs in Iraq) or linguistic identities (e.g., Ossetian and Georgian groups in Georgia) fall into this category. It is this component of an ascriptive identity, and the politicization of that identity, that distinguishes ethnic civil war from other forms of civil war. The ascriptive component can lead militant organizations to identify entire ethnic groups as loyal or disloyal within a country’s population in a way that ideological conflicts cannot.<sup>20</sup> In

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18. The dangers of leaving both sides to “fight it out” are immense: from a security standpoint, there is a real danger that the war could spread, through diffusion or contagion, into a wider regional war; from a moral standpoint, there is a threat of the mass killing of civilians and potential genocide. For arguments on this topic, see Lake and Rothchild, *The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict*. Third-party peacekeeping has proven viable where a third party has vested interests to commit troops and resources. Although many analysts have argued the case for greater intervention, most recognize that the preponderance of obstacles, national and international, leaves little hope for such commitments even in ethically justified interventions. For a normative argument in support of greater intervention, see Stanley Hoffmann, “The Politics and Ethics of Military Intervention,” *Survival*, Vol. 37, No. 4 (Winter 1995–96), pp. 29–51.

19. For detailed discussion, see Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, pp. 41–54. See also Ashutosh Varshney’s discussion of broader and narrower usages of the term “ethnic violence,” in Varshney, *Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2002). Varshney refers to “communal” groups as “religious” groups, whereas Ted Robert Gurr defines them as “cultural and religious identity groups.” See Gurr, “Why Minorities Rebel: A Global Analysis of Communal Mobilization and Conflict since 1945,” *International Political Science Review*, Vol. 14, No. 2 (April 1993), pp. 161–201, at p. 161. See also James D. Fearon’s discussion of ethnicity with its emphasis on descent and “social relevance” in Fearon, “Ethnic Mobilization and Ethnic Violence,” in Barry R. Weingast and Donald A. Wittman, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 852–868.

20. Numerous definitions of ethnic war exist. The Political Instability Task Force (formerly the State Failure Task Force), a U.S. government-sponsored research project to build a database on major domestic political conflicts, focuses on the political mobilization of ethnic groups as the key factor, defining ethnic wars as “secessionist civil wars, rebellions, protracted communal warfare, and sustained episodes of mass protest by politically organized communal groups.” See Daniel C. Esty, Jack A. Goldstone, Ted Robert Gurr, Pamela T. Surko, and Alan N. Unger, “Working Papers

fact, ethnic group members often go to great lengths to find out who is a member of an “enemy” group, including the use of census data in Nazi Germany, electoral lists in Sri Lanka, and identity cards in Rwanda.<sup>21</sup>

The concept of ethnic civil war does not assume primordial identity in the sense that groups are fixed and unchanging, nor does it require fixed individual identities.<sup>22</sup> In fact, the concept of an “ethnic war” is still compatible with mainstream constructivist understandings of individuals sharing multiple, overlapping identities, some of which become more salient than others depending on the context.<sup>23</sup> Advocates of partition need not accept ethnic identity as given, only that it becomes given under certain conditions. In pre-colonial Rwanda and Burundi, for example, Hutu and Tutsi identities were flexible, but this was certainly not the case during the 1994 Rwandan genocide, when some Hutus targeted all Tutsis because of their ethnic identity.<sup>24</sup> In the words of one individual caught up in the Bosnian ethnic civil war, “I am a Croat. . . . I was Yugoslavian, and now I am a Croat. I always knew that I am a Croat, but I didn’t feel it so much. Now, you have to be Croat, Serb, Muslim, Jewish, or whatever. . . . For me personally, these identities didn’t interest me at all: my being a Croat wasn’t important. But now, you have to be.”<sup>25</sup>

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State Failure Task Force Report” (McLean, Va.: Science Applications International Cooperation, November 30, 1995). Ethnic wars may also involve different goals, recruitment patterns, and in some cases, forced population migration based on ethnicity (sometimes called “ethnic cleansing”). Coding ethnic civil wars typically involves the ethnic groups seeking changes in their status or in government policies directed toward them, whether that be an end to repression, increased power at the center, or secession. For a comprehensive discussion, see Nicholas Sambanis, “Do Ethnic and Nonethnic Civil Wars Have the Same Causes? A Theoretical and Empirical Inquiry (Part I),” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 45, No. 3 (June 2001), pp. 259–282; and Nicholas Sambanis, “What Is an Ethnic War? Organization and Interests in Insurgencies,” unpublished paper, Yale University, 2006.

21. Helen M. Hintjens, “Explaining the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda,” *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 37, No. 2 (June 1999), pp. 241–286; Kaufmann, “Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Wars”; and William Seltzer, “Population Statistics, the Holocaust, and the Nuremberg Trials,” *Population and Development Review*, Vol. 24, No. 3 (September 1998), pp. 511–552.

22. Some scholars do not agree. Kaufmann, for example, states that “ethnic identities are fixed at birth.” See Kaufmann, “Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars,” p. 140.

23. Rogers Brubaker has been at the forefront of challenging his colleagues to move beyond “constructivist clichés” that characterize identities as multiple, unstable, contingent, and so on, and to examine the ways in which the practice of reification works: “As analysts, we should . . . try to account for the ways in which—and the conditions under which—this practice of reification, this powerful crystallization of group feeling, can work.” See Brubaker, *Ethnicity without Groups* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004), p. 10. See also Frederik Barth, ed., *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Difference* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1969).

24. Hintjens, “Explaining the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda”; and René Lemarchand, *Burundi: Ethnic Conflict and Genocide* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1997).

25. Michael Fahy and Jonathan Mogul, “An Interview with Lidija Fekeza: An Archeologist in Sarajevo: Culture under Siege,” *Journal of the International Institute*, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Fall 1995), <http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.4750978.0003.109>. Similar quotes can be found in endless news reports, where some claim not to know which ethnic group they belonged prior to the conflict. One such



In contrast to ideological wars, where loyalties are more fluid both during and after combat, in ethnic wars, members of one ethnic group are far less likely to fight for the opposing side,<sup>26</sup> dividing communities and making post-war reconciliation in an intermingled state very difficult—some would argue impossible.<sup>27</sup> As Chaim Kaufmann states, “War hardens ethnic identities to the point that cross-ethnic political appeals become futile, which means that victory can be assured only by physical control over the territory in dispute. Ethnic wars also generate intense security dilemmas, both because the escalation of each side’s mobilization rhetoric presents a real threat to the other, and even more because intermingled population settlement patterns create defensive vulnerabilities and offensive opportunities. . . . Once this occurs, the war cannot end until the security dilemma is reduced by physical separation of the rival groups.”<sup>28</sup>

#### THE ETHNIC SECURITY DILEMMA

A security dilemma can develop when, in an anarchical system, one state’s defensive action makes other states feel less secure, drawing two or more states into a conflict, even where none originally sought it.<sup>29</sup> Scholars have noted the

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individual stated, “Before this crisis I didn’t even know if I was a Serb or a Croat.” Quoted in Paul McGeough, “Fortress of Fear: First Battleground of a Civil War?” *Sydney Morning Herald*, May 18, 1991. See also Slavenka Drakulić, *The Balkan Express: Fragments from the Other Side of War* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1993), pp. 50–52, quoted in Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 20.

26. This is not to say that cross-ethnic appeals are impossible. As other scholars have pointed out, even during ethnic wars it is possible to find individuals from the rebellious ethnic group working for the government. Kaufmann argues this may occur when there is an “extreme power imbalance,” which would be consistent with Stathis N. Kalyvas’s argument that civilians will provide support to whichever actor has military dominance locally, although most of his cases come from colonial wars. I thank an anonymous reviewer for this last observation. See Kaufmann, “When All Else Fails,” p. 140; and Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006). This may explain how the Russian government was able to co-opt local rebel leaders and their followers (e.g., Akhmad Kadyrov and the so-called Kadyrovtsy) only after taking territorial control of most of Chechnya’s urban centers.

27. Kaufmann is the most vociferous about the impossibility of reintegration. See Kaufmann, “Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Wars.” Ideological conflicts may sometimes display fixed or inflexible identities. For example, during the Russian civil war of 1917–21, members of certain classes (e.g., “kulaks”) were targeted for deportation or death. For evidence of the extreme class-based nature of the early Soviet state, see Nicolas Werth, *Istoria Sovetskogo Gosudarstva* [History of the Soviet state] (Moskva: Izdatelstvo Ves Mir, 2003), pp. 145–146. In the Colombian civil war of 1948–62, some people believed that being a liberal or a conservative was genetic: “They [Conservatives] cut the genitals off other men so that they wouldn’t procreate any more Liberals.” Former priest Walter J. Broderick, quoted in Bert Ruiz, *The Colombian Civil War* (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 2001), p. 59. I thank an anonymous reviewer for sharing this quotation.

28. Kaufmann, “Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Wars,” p. 139.

29. Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” *World Politics*, Vol. 30, No. 1 (January 1978), pp. 167–214.

presence of security dilemmas in ethnic conflicts.<sup>30</sup> As empires collapse and states fail, the resulting anarchy causes competing and distrustful ethnic groups to engage in defensive actions that may seem threatening to other groups, thereby heightening tension. The mixture of different ethnic populations influences the intensity of a security dilemma and can encourage offensive military action even when defense is the overriding consideration: members of one ethnic group may try to save their kin located within the territorial confines of another ethnic group or, conversely, preemptively expel members of other ethnic groups located inside their own territory.<sup>31</sup> Some scholars have identified ethnically mixed regions as particularly prone to violence in ethnic wars. In discussing the former Yugoslavia, Hurst Hannum states, "Keeping 'trapped' Serbs within Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (and trapped Croats within the latter) may have actually contributed to continuation of the violence, since peaceful means of redrawing borders seem to have been excluded."<sup>32</sup>

Empirical results from Jaroslav Tir's study of postsecession war recurrence support this conclusion.<sup>33</sup> His examination of every secession and partition in the twentieth century finds that the presence of stay-behind minorities increases the likelihood of conflict.<sup>34</sup> To build a lasting peace, therefore, warring ethnic groups must be separated into homogeneous regions capable of self-defense. Kaufmann argues, "Solutions that aim both to restore multiethnic

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30. Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," *Survival*, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Spring 1993), pp. 27–47.

31. Some scholars have applied a similar logic to all states with ethnic minorities, maintaining that the greatest potential threat to any group is its own state, given the state's capacity to kill. As Stephen M. Saideman and his colleagues state, "The search for security motivates groups in divided societies to seek to control the state or secede if the state's neutrality cannot be assured." Indeed, as the advocates of partition argue, in an ethnic civil war the biased nature of the state has already been demonstrated, and all threatened groups must mobilize for self-defense. Saideman, David J. Lanoue, Michael Campenni, and Samuel Stanton, "Democratization, Political Institutions, and Ethnic Conflict: A Pooled Time Series Analysis, 1985–1998," *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 35, No. 1 (February 2002), pp. 103–129, at pp. 106–107 and p. 122. While the security dilemma has received broad support as an explanation within the ethnic war literature, its advocates do not claim that it explains all ethnic violence. For other explanations of ethnic violence, see Rogers Brubaker and David D. Laitin, "Ethnic and Nationalist Violence," *Annual Review of Sociology*, Vol. 24 (1998), pp. 423–452.

32. Hurst Hannum, "Territorial Autonomy: Permanent Solution or Step toward Secession?" in Andreas Wimmer, Richard J. Goldstone, Donald L. Horowitz, Ulrike Joras, and Conrad Schetter, eds., *Facing Ethnic Conflicts: Toward a New Realism* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004), p. 280.

33. Tir, "Keeping the Peace after Secession."

34. Tir uses the territorial dispute data set developed by Paul K. Huth and Todd L. Allee, which includes a variable for whether territory is ethnically valued, that is, when a minority group shares ethnic traits similar to those of the largest ethnic group within the challenging state (including speaking the same language). See Huth and Allee, *The Democratic Peace and Territorial Conflict in the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

civil politics and to avoid population transfers, such as institution building, power sharing, and identity reconstruction, cannot work during or after an ethnic civil war because they do not resolve the security dilemma created by mixed demography.”<sup>35</sup>

#### THE ROLE OF SOVEREIGNTY IN PARTITION

Scholars have differed on the role of sovereignty in ending ethnic wars and ensuring long-term peace. Supporters of partition, such as Kaufmann, initially argued that demographic separation with regional autonomy was sufficient, as long as that autonomy protected the group’s key interests and provided for “regional defense capabilities.”<sup>36</sup> Alexander Downes, on the other hand, later stressed that sovereignty is an essential ingredient.<sup>37</sup> Moving beyond the security dilemma, Downes suggests that even where populations have been separated, autonomy alone is not enough to maintain peace. The very process of ethnic civil war, he claims, “makes reconstructing a multiethnic state afterwards problematic because it destroys the parties’ ability to trust each other not to violate any agreement negotiated.”<sup>38</sup> Downes and others therefore maintain that to be successful, partition must include both political sovereignty (i.e., independence) as well as the separation of ethnic groups.<sup>39</sup>

#### POPULATION TRANSFERS AND HUMANITARIAN OBJECTIVES

Debates over partition that had traditionally focused on the normative goal of self-determination started to change in the mid-1990s, when academics such as

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35. Kaufmann, “When All Else Fails,” p. 122.

36. Kaufmann states, “The critical causal factor is separation of people into defensible enclaves, not partition of sovereignty.” Kaufmann, “Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Wars,” p. 162.

37. Downes, “The Holy Land Divided”; and Alexander B. Downes, “More Borders, Less Conflict? Partition as a Solution to Ethnic Civil Wars,” *SAIS Review*, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Winter/Spring 2006), pp. 49–61.

38. *Ibid.*, p. 61. Downes’s explanation moves partition beyond the confines of the security dilemma alone.

39. Kaufmann has implicitly supported this notion of sovereignty by examining only case studies of partition that included at least de facto sovereignty, and more recently, has explicitly supported this notion. See Kaufmann, “When All Else Fails,” especially pp. 124–126; and Chaim Kaufmann, “‘Partition Theory’ in the Marketplace of Ideas, and in Iraq,” in Mia Bloom and Roy Licklider, eds., *Living Together after Ethnic Killing: Exploring the Chaim Kaufmann Argument* (New York: Routledge, 2007). The requirement for political sovereignty and demographic separation negates some of the recent criticisms leveled against partition. David D. Laitin, for example, relies on data from the Minorities at Risk (MAR) data set focusing on the conflict-prone nature of group concentration within a unified state, which suggests that higher demographic separation would likely lead to increased rebellion. Laitin does not, however, look at separation with sovereignty and does not look at full demographic separation—the MAR data force him to include only higher and lower levels of group concentration within a country. Laitin, “Ethnic Unmixing and Civil War,” *Security Studies*, Vol. 13, No. 4 (Summer 2004), pp. 350–365.

Kaufmann, John Mearsheimer, and Stephen Van Evera began to propose partition as a way to minimize the number of deaths and reduce the human suffering in ethnic civil wars.<sup>40</sup> Since borders can rarely be drawn to create ethnically homogeneous states, advocates of partition recommend population transfers to accomplish what would otherwise occur under worse conditions for civilian populations. The argument is that a third-party transfer would be better than forced transfers perpetrated by enemy militias aiming for ethnic cleansing or worse.<sup>41</sup>

Population transfer is a controversial subject that has been open to serious criticism for at least two reasons. First, even organized population transfers, if involuntary, are a violation of fundamental human rights enshrined in international law.<sup>42</sup> Second, there is debate about the degree to which any power can conduct “humane” population transfers. A cursory look at examples from the twentieth century reveals a chaotic and lethal record, primarily affecting civilians.<sup>43</sup>

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40. See Tullberg and Tullberg’s roundtable article where they outline a “rational model” for solving ethnic conflicts that involves the democratic choice by an ethnic group to secede. The authors argue that “migration over the border between the newly formed states should be part of such a solution.” Tullberg and Tullberg, “Separation or Unity?” p. 237. For a brief earlier overview of the history of the partition debate, see Kumar, “The Troubled History of Partition.” See also Schaeffer, *Warpaths*, especially pts. 1 and 2.

41. Kaufmann wrote, “The international community should endorse separation as a remedy for at least some communal conflicts; otherwise the process of war will separate the populations anyway, at much higher human cost.” See Kaufmann, “When All Else Fails,” pp. 122–123. Mearsheimer and Van Evera argue, “U.S. policymakers must be willing at times to decide that states cannot be sustained and should instead be disassembled. Only if we accept this reality honestly and promptly will we have a reasonable chance of managing their disassembly and keeping it relatively peaceful. Partition should remain a last resort, but, regrettably, we still live in a world where it is sometimes necessary.” Mearsheimer and Van Evera, “When Peace Means War,” p. 21.

42. Population transfers are considered a violation of such human rights as the freedom of movement (UDHR 13), the right to own property (UDHR17), and the right to a family life (UDHR 12). For an examination of population transfers in international law, see, for example, Alfred M. de Zayas, “International Law and Mass Population Transfers,” *Harvard International Law Journal*, Vol. 16, No. 2 (Spring 1975), pp. 207–258; and Christopher M. Goebel, “Population Transfer, Humanitarian Law, and the Use of Ground Force in U.N. Peacemaking: Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Wake of Iraq,” *New York University Journal of International Law and Politics*, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Spring 1993), pp. 627–698.

43. Stories and images of the millions injured and dead that accompanied the population transfers in postpartition Cyprus, India, and Palestine are enough for many to condemn this method as barbaric. Critics charge that this experience should be enough to dismiss the idea that even “organized” population transfers are possible. See Kumar, *Divide and Fall?* especially chaps. 1–3; and Schaeffer, *Warpaths*, especially chap. 9. Advocates of partition counter that the cases selected as evidence to refute its effectiveness did not deal with the type they are recommending; they either did not involve the necessary demographic separation or were not implemented as solutions to ethnic civil war. For example, in each of the cases highlighted by Kumar, organized population transfers were not an integral part of the advanced decisionmaking process for partition, arguably leading to a greater degree of bloodshed and suffering. In addition, the outcome from the 1923 population exchange between Greece and Turkey, though far from perfect, does suggest that not all transfers must result in the catastrophic deaths seen after the partition of British India. Kalliopi K. Koufa

In addition to raising serious concerns over the ethics of population transfers, critics of partition theory level two broader objections: first, partitions transform internal wars into international ones; and second, they do not solve ethnic antagonisms. Advocates of partition counter that postpartition wars tend to occur where populations were not separated (e.g., postpartition Ireland, British India, and Palestine).<sup>44</sup> In addition, they note that conflicts between postpartition states are often the subject of greater international attention and diplomatic pressure, and thus are likely to be brought to an end sooner than if they remained internal conflicts. Moreover, the partitioned states are subject to international laws regulating war, potentially rendering any conflict less inhumane.<sup>45</sup> As for solving ethnic antagonisms, it is not clear whether this is within anyone's power. At a minimum, the separation of warring ethnic groups reduces the security threat, which may give moderate politicians within each group a chance to be heard.<sup>46</sup>

If separating warring ethnic groups through partition can be shown to prevent the recurrence of ethnic war, then the international community should accord it greater consideration when seeking solutions to such conflicts. It was with this challenge in mind that Sambanis undertook his cross-national study, arguing that "beyond a handful of self-selected cases, partition theorists have not presented proof that partition is the only viable and credible solution to ethnic civil war. They have not even proven that partition outperforms other war outcomes in terms of peace-building potential."<sup>47</sup> The following section outlines both Sambanis's evaluation and the data set used in this study.

and Constantinos Svolopoulos present one side, but for a critical assessment of the long-term difficulties of the integration of refugees in this case, see Renée Hirschon, *Heirs of the Greek Catastrophe: The Social Life of Asia Minor Refugees in Piraeus* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); and Koufa and Svolopoulos, "The Compulsory Exchange of Populations between Greece and Turkey: The Settlement of Minority Questions at the Conference of Lausanne and Its Impact on Greek-Turkish Relations," in Paul Smith, ed., *Ethnic Groups in International Relations* (Hanover, N.H.: Dartmouth, 1991), pp. 275–308.

44. Downes, for example, writes, "Implementing partition without separating the groups in conflict to reduce or eliminate the number of minorities left behind is sure to see them cleansed, or for conflict over the intermingled region to continue. Examples of this problem include Kashmir in India . . . and Northern Ireland." Downes, "The Holy Land Divided," p. 74.

45. See, for example, Ward Thomas, *The Ethics of Destruction: Norms and Force in International Relations* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2001), which includes an examination of aerial bombing of civilian targets during war. For a review of literature examining state compliance with international norms and treaties, including the regulation of force during war, see Harold Hongju Koh, "Why Do Nations Obey International Law?" *Yale Law Journal*, Vol. 106, No. 8 (January 1997), pp. 2599–2659. For a dissenting view with empirical evidence demonstrating no effect of international treaties on state behavior for civilian targeting during war, see Benjamin A. Valentino, Paul K. Huth, and Sarah Croco, "Covenants without the Sword: International Law and the Protection of Civilians in Times of War," *World Politics*, Vol. 58, No. 3 (April 2006), pp. 339–377.

46. Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Wars," pp. 173–174.

47. Sambanis, "Partition as a Solution to Ethnic War," p. 439.

### *Cross-National Statistical Testing of Partition Theory*

Sambanis compiled a data set of all civil wars between 1945 and 1999 to compare the effectiveness of partition with that of other causes of war termination and peace building.<sup>48</sup> Sambanis tested each of these independent variables, including partition, on three dependent variables: its ability to prevent war recurrence; its ability to reduce low-level postwar violence; and its ability to promote postwar democratization. Based on his analysis, Sambanis concluded that “although it may seem like a clean and easy solution, partition fares no better than other outcomes of ethnic civil war.”<sup>49</sup> He also concluded that “the evidence does not support the assertion that partition significantly reduces the risk of war recurrence.”<sup>50</sup> He went on, “I can point to only very weak evidence in support of the hypothesis that partitions help end low-level ethnic violence. . . . More importantly, the positive impact of partitions seems fragile and extremely dependent.”<sup>51</sup>

Sambanis used a broad definition of ethnic civil war, which allowed him to draw on a variety of civil war-related databases.<sup>52</sup> He based his definition on six criteria: the war caused more than 1,000 battle deaths; it challenged the sovereignty of an internationally recognized state; it occurred within the recognized boundaries of that state; it involved the state as one of the principal combatants; it included rebels with the ability to mount an organized opposition; and it involved parties concerned with the prospect of living together in the same political unit after the end of the war.<sup>53</sup>

Sambanis’s definition of low-level violence follows largely from Peter Wallensteen and Margareta Sollenberg’s data set that coded all armed conflicts causing 25 or more deaths but falling short of war.<sup>54</sup> Sambanis defined parti-

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48. These variables include gross domestic product per capita, cost of the war as measured by deaths and injury, and the war’s outcome (government victory, rebel victory, etc.). *Ibid.*, p. 469.

49. *Ibid.*, p. 439.

50. *Ibid.*, p. 473.

51. Sambanis states that the outcome of partition depends on the following criteria: whether the war ended in a treaty, the war’s intensity, the number of people displaced by the war, and the number and size of ethnic groups. *Ibid.*, p. 478.

52. For consistency, I follow Sambanis’s coding for ethnic war. He categorized such wars with reference to as many sources as he could consult. See *ibid.*, p. 455 n. 49.

53. See *ibid.*, p. 444. The definition is relatively uncontroversial except for its “1,000 deaths,” which does not require an annual death threshold, but rather “1,000 [battle] deaths for the duration of the war.” See Nicholas Sambanis, “Appendix B: Data-Set Notes” (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2000), p. 2. For a detailed discussion about the use of battle deaths in the quantitative, cross-national data set, see Nicholas Sambanis, “What Is Civil War? Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an Operational Definition,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 48, No. 6 (December 2004), pp. 814–858.

54. Peter Wallensteen and Margareta Sollenberg, “Armed Conflicts, Conflict Termination, and



tion as “a war outcome that involves both border adjustment and demographic changes.”<sup>55</sup> This article follows Sambanis and includes instances of both “partition” and “secession.” Traditionally a partition was understood as a “fresh division” of territory, usually executed by a sovereign (often great) power that occurred at the time of decolonization.<sup>56</sup> In my study, however, who imposes partition is relatively unimportant: the critical factor is whether dividing warring groups into separate entities can prevent war recurrence.<sup>57</sup> Further, whether it is possible to accurately distinguish between secessions and partitions is unclear: Kaufmann, for example, codes Cyprus (1974) as a “partition” but Abkhazia (1992–93) a “secession,” even though both Turkish Cypriots and Abkhaz were involved in separatist movements that were ultimately successful because of assistance from an external power (Turkey and Russia, respectively).<sup>58</sup> Moreover, given that the implications of partition theory affect partitions and secessions equally in the minds of academics and policymakers, it is logical to code both. Finally, it is relatively unimportant whether a postpartitioned entity achieves *de jure* sovereignty (as in the case of Bangladesh’s internationally recognized separation from Pakistan) or *de facto* sovereignty (as in the case of South Ossetia’s unrecognized separation from Georgia); therefore both types are included. Although some scholars have begun to include wars of decolonization in data sets of civil wars (e.g., Algeria’s independence from France and Mozambique’s from Portugal), this practice re-

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Peace Agreements, 1989–1996,” *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 34, No. 3 (August 1997), pp. 339–358; and Sambanis, “Appendix B.”

55. Sambanis, “Partition as a Solution to Ethnic War,” p. 445. These partitions deliberately exclude instances of peaceful partition, such as Czechoslovakia. For further examination of partition under conditions of peace, see Tir, “Keeping the Peace after Secession.”

56. Schaeffer, *Warpaths*, p. 5.

57. Debates regarding differences between secession and decolonization also exist, but they do not advance the current debate on partition: to suggest that the “separation” of Nigeria and the United Kingdom is similar to the “separation” of Azerbaijan and Nagorno Karabakh conflates two very different events and only obfuscates the partition process in the current debate on ethnic civil wars. Further, the word “colonization” in ethnic civil wars is highly contested. For example, Chechen insurgents claim to be waging a war of liberation against the “colonizing” center of Moscow, whereas Moscow claims the uprising is a secession and sees Chechnya as an integral part of the Russian Federation. In the military campaign beginning in 1999, Russia labeled the Chechen insurgents no longer as secessionists but as bandits, criminals, or Wahhabi radicals. For purposes of analysis, many academics put partition, secession, and decolonization in the same category. McGarry and O’Leary lump “partition and/or secession (self determination)” together in their taxonomy, and include decolonization within it. McGarry and O’Leary, *The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation*, pp. 11–16.

58. Kaufmann, “When All Else Fails,” p. 126. The role of Turkey in facilitating the *de facto* independence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus has been well documented. For the critical role of Russia in enabling Abkhazia’s *de facto* independence, see Monica Duffy Toft, *The Geography of Ethnic Violence: Identity, Interests, and the Indivisibility of Territory* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003), pp. 87–106.

mains questionable conceptually.<sup>59</sup> Moreover, because I am primarily interested in reevaluating Sambanis's analysis, like him, I exclude such wars. Using Sambanis's data set, I was able to reproduce his estimates.

My cases differ slightly from those used by Sambanis. First, I excluded Tajikistan because it did not undergo a recognizable partition during or after its civil war, and because most experts deemed it a regional and ideological, not ethnic, conflict.<sup>60</sup> Second, I included the case of Bosnia, but where Sambanis uses the 1992 partition, I used the 1995 partition. The 1992 partition of Bosnia from Yugoslavia did not occur at the end of the war, which raged for three more years.<sup>61</sup> I coded the Dayton accord<sup>62</sup> as a partition of Bosnia between Serbs, on the one hand, and Bosniaks and Croats on the other.<sup>63</sup> The territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina was divided into two de facto states in 1995, each maintaining separate armed forces that cannot enter the other's territory.<sup>64</sup> This qualifies Bosnia as a partition. As the realist scholars John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt confirmed at the time, Bosnia "produced a

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59. Some civil war databases, such as those used by Fearon, "Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others?" include wars of decolonization. Others, such as Licklider, "The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars," do not. The Correlates of War project separates these into "internal wars" and "extrasystemic wars." Fearon and Laitin run their analysis both with and without wars of decolonization when testing for causes of civil war onset, recognizing conceptual and theoretical problems for both inclusion and exclusion. Fearon and Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War."

60. It was not clear from the Sambanis article or notes in Appendix B why Tajikistan was coded as a partition or an ethnic civil war; Tajikistan's separation from the Soviet Union occurred before its war began. Sambanis recognizes Tajikistan as a coding error in Nicholas Sambanis, "Partition and Civil War Recurrence: A Re-Examination of the Evidence," Yale University, 2006. For Tajikistan as a regional and ideological conflict, see Payam Foroughi, "Tajikistan: Nationalism, Ethnicity, Conflict, and Socio-Economic Disparities—Sources and Solutions," *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, Vol. 22, No. 1 (April 2002), pp. 39–62; and Dov Lynch, "The Tajik Civil War and Peace Process," *Civil Wars*, Vol. 4, No. 4 (Winter 2001), pp. 49–72.

61. Sambanis states, "Bosnian partition from Yugoslavia in 1992." Sambanis, "Appendix B," p. 43. He recognizes some of these issues in Sambanis, "Partition and Civil War Recurrence."

62. The General Framework for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina was initialed in Dayton, Ohio, on November 21, 1995, and signed in Paris on December 14, 1995.

63. Inclusion of the Republika Srpska partition from Bosnia also means that I added the Bosniak-Croat dyad as a case of ethnic war ending without the partition of sovereignty. This case does not appear in Tables 1 and 2, which include such partitions, but it does appear in the later comparison between partitions and other war outcomes.

64. The two republics are Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This is not a case of territorial autonomy because there are separate governments with armed forces that cannot enter each other's territory. The primary conflict was between Serb forces, on the one hand, and Croat and Bosnian forces on the other, although the Croat and Bosnian forces also fought each other from mid-1993 until the signing of the Washington treaty of March 18, 1994, after which they fought together against Serb forces. Other possibilities therefore include separate Bosniak-Serb and Croat-Serb codings for partition, but the figures for separation are virtually the same and do not affect the results, except to provide an additional "partition." Further, given the conflict between Croat and Bosniak forces, one could include this as an ethnic war without partition as the outcome. Again, these data do not affect the final results when comparing partition to nonpartition.

partition settlement. . . . The settlement is a veiled partition but a partition nevertheless.”<sup>65</sup> Third, I excluded the 1992 Croatia case because of the difficulty of categorizing it as a war end. Although there were cease-fires between the Zagreb-based Croatian authorities and the Knin-based Republic of Serbian Krajina (RSK),<sup>66</sup> the conflict between Yugoslavian/Serb and Croatian forces continued in many regions, including the Serb siege of Dubrovnik and the Croat siege of Bihać. In addition, serious military operations between the forces of the RSK and Croatia’s army resumed soon after each cease-fire.<sup>67</sup> I therefore excluded this case from the analysis. Given the ongoing violence between Yugoslavian/Serb and Croat forces between 1991 and 1995,<sup>68</sup> it is more appropriate to consider this a Croatian “war of independence,” ending with the partition of Croatia from Yugoslavia in 1995, which is what I included in my analysis.<sup>69</sup> Finally, I updated all relevant variables for all cases of ethnic civil war through mid-2004. This update includes the 1999 partition of Kosovo from Yugoslavia.

More important, I introduce a new independent variable for analysis. This new variable is critical because Sambanis’s definition of partition relies on the existence of border and demographic changes but not the degree of separation between ethnic groups. The following section outlines my alternative approach.

### *The Centrality of Demography*

If, as supporters of partition argue, the critical independent variable is demography, and if partitioned countries with new minorities increase the security threat, then demographic changes need to be captured for use as an independent variable. Social scientists have not developed many demographic indicators to capture degrees of ethnic heterogeneity. Tatu Vanhanen, for example, created the ethnic heterogeneity index to explore the general relationship be-

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65. Measheimer and Walt, “When Peace Means War,” p. 16.

66. RSK had a separate government and armed forces.

67. See, for example, military operations in both the Lika region of RSK (Operation Medak Pocket, September 1993) and the Maslenica and Zadar regions of RSK (Operation Maslenica, January 1993). By the time of the next cease-fire, in 1994, Croatian forces were already preparing Operation Flash, which began in May 1995.

68. The Yugoslav National Army was heavily involved in the wars for the RSK, as was Slobodan Milošević.

69. This is, in fact, how most Croats understand the war (commonly labeled “Domovinski Rat” in Croatian) from 1991 to 1995. In “Partition and Civil War Recurrence,” Sambanis excludes Croatia altogether, which I find surprising given that the definition he uses for partition in this paper is “an outcome of a civil war that . . . leads to the formation of a new state out of a part of another state.” This is what occurred in Croatia, where war began in 1991. See Sambanis, “Partition and Civil War Recurrence.”

tween ethnic conflict and ethnic division.<sup>70</sup> Daniel Posner developed an index based on politically relevant ethnic groups.<sup>71</sup> Neither index, however, can identify which groups were at war and the degree to which they separated after the war. To address this problem, I created the Postpartition Ethnic Homogeneity Index (PEHI).

#### POSTPARTITION ETHNIC HOMOGENEITY INDEX

In constructing the PEHI, I began with a state that contains a titular ethnic group and a minority ethnic group. The two groups engage in a civil war, and at some point, their territory is partitioned in the hopes of ending the conflict. The result is two countries, each with its own titular majority as well as a potentially “stay-behind” minority from the other ethnic group. Determining the degree to which the ethnic groups were separated requires knowing (1) the percentage of the minority group in the original country (recorded as OSM, for original state minority); (2) the percentage of the original minority left in the rump state after partition (RSM, for rump state minority); and (3) the percentage of the original titular group now found as a minority inside the new state (NSM, for new state minority).

Given the theoretical focus on demography, with an understanding that leaving sizable minorities on either side of a new border could increase the chances of renewed warfare and low-level violence, this index uses both new minorities to calculate the degree to which partition and population transfers succeeded in separating the warring groups. For countries with more than two ethnic groups at war, groups were aggregated if they fought on the same side or if they were treated as one by the opposing force;<sup>72</sup> if there were separate warring ethnic dyads within a civil war, they were treated as separate wars.

To calculate the PEHI, I subtracted the new minority percentages (RSM and NSM) from the original minority percentage (OSM). I then divided this percentage by the original minority percentage (OSM) and multiplied the result by 100. This simple calculation yields the percentage change in the size of eth-

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70. Tatu Vanhanen, “Domestic Ethnic Conflict and Ethnic Nepotism: A Comparative Analysis,” *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 36, No. 1 (January 1999), pp. 55–73.

71. Daniel N. Posner, “Measuring Ethnic Fractionalization in Africa,” *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 48, No. 4 (October 2004), pp. 849–863.

72. The Minorities at Risk Project follows a similar guideline when aggregating groups vis-à-vis the government. In Darfur today, for example, MAR codes the “Black Muslims of Darfur” as a group, even though it comprises three different groups: Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa. The same formula is used for the “Southerners” group in Sudan, which comprises Anuaks, Azande, Dinkas, Equatorians, Latukas, Madi, Moru, Nuers, Shilluks, Taposas, and Turkan. See Minorities at Risk Project, “Assessment for Southerners in Sudan” and “Assessment for Darfur Black Muslims in Sudan” (College Park: Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland, 2005), <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/>.

nic minorities produced by partitioning the country, thus indicating the degree of ethnic separation:

$$\text{PEHI} = \frac{\text{OSM} - (\text{RSM} + \text{NSM})}{\text{OSM}} \times 100.$$

The higher the PEHI number, the greater the degree of separation achieved by partition. The maximum score a partition can receive is +100, indicating a complete separation of the warring ethnic groups. This number falls as the size of the stay-behind minorities grows relative to the original minority percentage.<sup>73</sup>

#### CODING OF THE PEHI

Timely data on minority populations in the aftermath of ethnic civil wars proved difficult to find. For coding, I relied on a staple set of books and encyclopedias.<sup>74</sup> The guiding principle in gathering the data was to have at least two credible sources provide the same numbers; when these numbers were close but not exact, an average was taken. Where two sources could not be found among the staple, I consulted case-specific academic publications and news reports gauging refugee flows of ethnic groups.<sup>75</sup> Where data were unavailable for the year immediately after partition, I used the first available data.

#### RESULTS

Table 1 presents the PEHI component figures from the seventeen cases of partition that occurred after ethnic civil wars between 1945 and 2004. For example, in Azerbaijan the OSM—in this case, the Armenians—formed 5.8 percent of

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73. There are different ways to calculate the PEHI. One alternative is to look at the separation from both sides by including an indicator of the percentage of the original majority found in the minority region prior to the war (e.g., ethnic Russians in Chechnya before 1994), which I label MiM (majority in minority region), and then to calculate the index as:

$$[(\text{MiM} + \text{OSM}) - (\text{RSM} + \text{NSM})] / (\text{MiM} + \text{OSM}).$$

I conducted a sensitivity test using this formula, and others, and found no substantive differences in the results: those cases with high degrees of unmixing scored highly using all formulas.

74. The staple set consisted of *Encyclopedia Columbia*, 2001; *Encyclopedia Britannica*, 2003; Patrick Brogan, *The Fighting Never Stopped: A Comprehensive Guide to World Strife since 1945* (New York: Vintage, 1990); Guy Arnold, *Wars in the Third World since 1945* (London: Cassell, 1995); *Economist* and the *Economist Intelligence Unit*, <http://www.economist.com>; CIA World Factbooks; Lexis-Nexis Academic; and International Crisis Group reports.

75. For some conflicts, I needed to use refugee flows to calculate minority percentages, in which case prewar minority percentages were used to obtain absolute numbers of the minority, and refugee numbers were subtracted from the total to arrive at an approximation of the minority remaining in the territory. Where large refugee movements occurred—many of these conflicts forced hundreds of thousands of people from their homes—exact numbers were impossible to obtain, so approximations were required.

Table 1. Calculation of PEHI Values for Partitions after Ethnic Civil War

Country	Original State Minority	Rump State Minority	New State Minority	Postpartition Ethnic Homogeneity Index
Azerbaijan–Nagorno Karabakh (1994)	5.8	0.25	<0.01	95.69
Bosnia (1995)	31.2	2.30	3.20	86.40
Cyprus (1963)	18.2	11.90	<0.01	34.60
Cyprus (1974)	12.3	<0.01	<0.01	100.00
Ethiopia-Eritrea (1991)	6.4	0.12	<0.01	98.13
Georgia-Abkhazia (1993)	1.8	<0.01	0.08	99.83
Georgia-South Ossetia (1994)	3.0	<0.01	0.05	98.33
India-Kashmir (1965)	10.4	10.40	3.00	-28.85
India-Kashmir (1989–94)	10.4	10.40	3.00	-28.85
India-Pakistan (1947–48)	24.4	10.40	1.60	50.82
Israel-Palestine (1948)	33.3	<0.01	13.80	58.56
Moldova (1992)	31.0	24.00	40.50	-108.06
Pakistan-Bangladesh (1971)	46.0	0.30	0.20	98.91
Russia-Chechnya (1996)	0.6	0.30	2.50	-366.67
Somalia (1992)	27.4	25.00	28.00	-93.43
Yugoslavia-Croatia (1995)	19.7	1.10	4.49	71.62
Yugoslavia-Kosovo (1999)	14.0	0.70	6.00	52.14

NOTE: Scores of <0.01 assume a value of 0 for calculation of the Postpartition Ethnic Homogeneity Index.


Azerbaijan’s population before the civil war. After the civil war, approximately 20,000 Armenians remained in rump Azerbaijan, creating an RSM of 0.25 percent. The number of Azeris found in the new state of Nagorno Karabakh after the war ended was negligible (NSM < 0.01). The following equation reflects the PEHI for the case of Azerbaijan:

$$\text{PEHI (Azerbaijan-Nagorno Karabakh)} = \frac{5.8 - (0.25 + 0)}{5.8} \times 100 = 95.69.$$

The PEHI shows what was achieved with partition. Rather than a simple binary code indicating if de facto sovereignty was achieved, the PEHI captures the degree to which minorities were separated. For example, the 1963–64 partition of Cyprus, where Turks migrated into small defensive enclaves during intense interethnic war, failed to significantly divide the populations, leaving a large number of Turks outside the defensible enclaves. According to the PEHI, this partition homogenized the territories by a paltry 34.6 percent, reducing the security dilemma only marginally. Partition theory would expect a high likelihood of war recurrence under these conditions, which is what took place. In contrast, Azerbaijan’s partition succeeded in separating Azeris and Arme-



Figure 1. Components of the Postpartition Ethnic Homogeneity Index



nians, with a PEHI of close to 100 percent. As predicted by partition theory, there has been no recurrence of war.

### Examining the PEHI

I added the PEHI to the Sambanis data set to assess its impact on the most crucial dependent variable: war recurrence. Using binary probit, the variable *warend2* (no war recurrence for at least two years after the end of the civil war) was regressed on the continuous variable PEHI only for ethnic wars that experienced partition, controlling for the original minority percentage. The

Table 2. Complete and Incomplete Partitions

Country	Postpartition Ethnic Homogeneity Index	Complete Partition	War Ended for Two Years	War Ended for Five Years	Low-Level Violence Ended for Two Years	Low-Level Violence Ended for Five Years
Azerbaijan–Nagorno Karabakh (1994)	– 95.69	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Bosnia (1995)	86.40	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cyprus (1963)	34.60	No	No	No	No	No
Cyprus (1974)	–100.00	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Ethiopia-Eritrea (1991)	– 98.13	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Georgia-Abkhazia (1993)	– 99.83	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Georgia-South Ossetia (1994)	– 98.33	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
India-Kashmir (1965)	–28.85	No	Yes	No	No	No
India-Kashmir (1989–94)	–28.85	No	Yes	No	No	No
India-Pakistan (1947–48)	50.82	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Israel-Palestine (1948)	58.56	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Moldova (1992)	–108.06	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Pakistan-Bangladesh (1971)	– 98.91	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Russia-Chechnya (1996)	–366.67	No	No	No	No	No
Somalia (1992)	–93.43	No	No	No	No	No
Yugoslavia-Croatia (1995)	71.62	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Yugoslavia-Kosovo (1999)	52.14	No	Yes	Yes	No	No

results demonstrated a positive coefficient (i.e., the higher the ethnodemographic separation, the less likely war will recur within the first two years), significant at the 0.1 level for a one-tailed test. Due to a small *n*, however, these results are at most suggestive, given the statistical problem that, as yet, there have been too few partitions. For these statistical results, see the appendix.

The PEHI indicates whether any one partition selected from the database would be considered a “complete” partition or an “incomplete” partition by partition advocates. A complete partition is one in which the warring minorities are fully separated, leaving negligible stay-behind minorities; an incomplete partition is one in which the minorities are not separated, leaving sizable

stay-behind minorities in either of the two emerging states. For this study, any partition that succeeded in separating the warring parties by a PEHI of 95 percent or more is considered a complete partition. The threshold of 95 percent is not fixed, but rather should be seen as a guide to indicate partitions where ethnic groups have been effectively separated in their entirety, a critical demand by partition advocates.<sup>76</sup>

Table 2 compares complete and incomplete partitions against the two main criteria established by Sambanis: recurrence of war either two or five years after the end of a civil war, and recurrence of low-level violence within two or five years.<sup>77</sup> This five-year threshold is particularly significant given World Bank data suggesting that “the typical post-conflict country faces a 50 percent risk of renewed conflict within the first five years of reaching peace.”<sup>78</sup>

As the results in Table 2 indicate, for all partitions achieving a PEHI separation score of 95 percent or higher, there were no recurrences of war for at least five years, nor were there recurrences of low-level violence for five years. In fact, no partitioned state achieving a PEHI score above 70 percent experienced a recurrence of war or low-level violence, suggesting the threshold of 95 percent could even be lowered. For partitions with lower PEHI scores, the results are mixed, with most countries experiencing either war recurrence or a return of low-level violence. This suggests that a partition that successfully separates warring ethnic groups produces substantially different results from partitions that do not separate the groups, which is what partition advocates predict. This further underscores the need to disaggregate partitions into those that separate the warring ethnic groups and those that do not. Although the number of cases is small—there have been only six cases of complete partition—the results are consistent and unambiguous. Given the small number, however, these results must be treated with caution. While partition advocates cannot be faulted for the lack of complete partitions since 1945, it is important to recognize the limits of currently available data.

One case that stands out is the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict. Although this parti-

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76. This accepts the inevitability of small, residual minorities that do not alter the value of the results. The average size of the largest residual minorities found after complete partitions amounted to a mere 0.33 percent. Kaufmann argues, “While peace requires separation of groups into distinct regions, it does not require total ethnic purity. Rather, remaining minorities must be small enough that the host group does not fear them as either a potential military threat or a possible target for irredentist rescue operations.” Kaufmann, “Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Wars,” p. 163.

77. Sambanis uses postwar democratization as a third criterion and finds postpartition states associated with higher levels of democracy. This article does not address these results because they do not form the core of the partition theory argument. Sambanis, “Partition as a Solution to Ethnic War,” pp. 459–464.

78. Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbom, “On the Duration of Civil War.”

tion meets the criteria established by Sambanis, with no recurrence of war or low-level violence between Ethiopia and Eritrea for at least five years after their partition, these countries did return to war in 1998, after a seven-year peace. Partition advocates do not claim, however, that separating warring ethnic groups will always prevent a return to war or low-level violence forever into the future; rather they claim that it is often the best option to give peace a chance. In addition, for this particular case, had more population transfers occurred at the time of partition, the tens of thousands of Eritreans remaining in Ethiopia would not have faced the horrific expulsions that occurred during the 1998–2000 war.<sup>79</sup>

Further, as mentioned earlier, partition advocates argue that any future war between partitioned states will be an improvement over a return to civil war, because the two sovereign states will be subjected to greater international attention and diplomatic pressure, increasing the likelihood of the war ending quickly. Ethiopia and Eritrea exemplify this logic: the civil war the two sides fought lasted more than fifteen years, whereas the interstate conflict of 1998 ended within two years following heavy international pressure. This positive result must be tempered, however, by the fact that international wars, though relatively infrequent in today's world, can be very lethal.<sup>80</sup>

There are several countries that experienced incomplete partitions—that is, partitions that do not completely separate the warring ethnic groups—and yet did not experience war recurrence or low-level violence within the first five years of the end of their civil wars. Although this indicates that demographic separation is not the only way to prevent war recurrence, a close look at the cases of states that did not experience war recurrence for five years reveals troubling insights. The conflict over India-Pakistan (1947–48) did not recur in the first five years, but the incomplete partition, which left substantially intermingled populations in place, was followed by three wars over the proceeding half century. The incomplete partition between Israel and Palestine (1948) was similarly followed by low-level violence and war recurrence over subsequent decades. Moreover, it was arguably the reintroduction of significant ethnic intermingling after Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza in 1967 that

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79. On the civilian expulsions, Minority Rights Group reported that by early 2000 more than 54,000 Ethiopians of Eritrean origin had been deported. Kjetil Tronvoll, "Ethiopia: A New Start?" (London: Minority Rights Group, 2000). Amnesty International reported in 1999 that "the expulsion of people of Eritrean origin was often carried out in an inhumane manner that amounts to cruel, inhumane, and degrading treatment." Amnesty International, "Ethiopia and Eritrea: Human Rights Issues in a Year of Armed Conflict" (New York: Amnesty International, 1999), p. 27.

80. The Ethiopian-Eritrean war of 1998–2000 resulted in more than 100,000 battle deaths.

Table 3. Comparison of Alternatives for War Recurrence

Did the War End for At Least Two Years?	Complete Partition	Incomplete Partition	No Partition	Total
Yes	6 (100%)	6 (55%)	45 (71%)	57 (71%)
No	0 (0%)	5 (45%)	18 (29%)	23 (29%)
Total	6	11	63	80

Chi-square = 3.92 ( $df=2$ ), Pr = 0.141

has led to heightened conflict. Croatia's "war of independence" (1991–95) also ended with an incomplete partition. Although the degree of ethnic unmixing was not enough to be deemed a complete partition by the strict criteria outlined in the article. The final Croatian military operation of the war in 1995 forced approximately 200,000 Serbs to flee Croatian territory, reducing the percentage of Serbs in Croatia by almost two-thirds by the end of the war, and therefore substantially unmixing the populations.<sup>81</sup>

A potential concern with the results of this analysis may be over the issue of endogeneity, or whether a selection bias has taken place where cases of complete partition occurred in states where ethnic minorities were already compact and homogeneous, and thus relatively easy to separate after a war without ethnic cleansing or large population transfers. Few communities are ethnically homogeneous, however, and even those ethnic groups that are territorially concentrated typically have a significant minority in their midst. In this analysis, all of the complete cases involved large-scale forced population transfers during the countries' wars, with the possible exception of Bangladesh.<sup>82</sup> Militias and government armed forces displaced hundreds of thousands of people during the two ethnic wars in Georgia, during the war over Nagorno Karabakh, and during the ethnic war in Cyprus. In the other partition reaching a high PEHI—Bosnia (86.4 percent)—armed forces displaced hundreds of

81. Operation Storm led 200,000 Croatian Serbs to flee into neighboring Serbia and Bosnia. See Amnesty International, "Croatia: Operation 'Storm'—Still No Justice Ten Years On" (New York: Amnesty International, August 4, 2005), pp. 1–3.

82. The case of Bangladesh is deceiving due to the large Bengali population that was largely separate from the rest of West Pakistan. Nevertheless, Urdu-speaking Biharis were the targets of violence, resulting in tens of thousands of deaths. A Pakistani white paper on the topic estimated that more than 60,000 Urdu-speaking Biharis were killed during the brief conflict. Government of Pakistan, *White Paper on the Crisis in East Pakistan*, August 5, 1971, <http://www.statelesspeopleinbangladesh.net/doc/gop-whitepaper.pdf>.

Table 4. Comparison of Alternatives for Recurrence of Low-Level Violence

Did Low-level Violence End for At Least Two Years?	Complete Partition	Incomplete Partition	No Partition	Total
Yes	6 (100%)	3 (27%)	23 (37%)	32 (40%)
No	0 (0%)	8 (73%)	40 (63%)	48 (60%)
Total	6	11	63	80

Chi-square = 10.063 ( $df=2$ ), Pr = 0.007

thousands of civilians based on their ethnic identity in what had been an ethnically intermixed territory.

### *Complete Partition versus the Alternatives*

A comparison of countries that experienced complete partitions with those that experienced other outcomes between 1945 and 2004 (i.e., incomplete partition or no partition) reveals the benefits of separating warring ethnic groups. Table 3 shows a cross-tabulation of countries whose ethnic wars ended for at least two years. Seventy-one percent of these wars did not recur. Nevertheless, in cases of complete partition, no country experienced a return to war (100 percent). The chi-square test produced a statistic of 3.92 for a probability of 0.14, although three cells have expected counts of less than 5.00.

In 68 percent of the cases, countries did not experience a recurrence of war for at least five years, while all cases of complete partition (100 percent) avoided a recurrence. The chi-square statistic is 6.07 for a probability of 0.048, statistically significant at the 0.05 level; again, three cells have an expected count of less than 5.00.

Turning now to low-level violence, an even greater contrast is evident between complete partition and the alternative of incomplete partition or no partition (see Table 4). In 60 percent of the cases, low-level violence did not end for the first two years. Strikingly, for those civil wars that ended with a complete partition, none experienced further low-level violence during that period. The chi-square value is 10.06 for a  $p$ -value of 0.007, statistically significant at the 0.01 level, although three cells have expected counts of less than 5.00.

In addition, countries in 60 percent of the cases were unable to prevent the outbreak of low-level violence for at least five years after ending their ethnic wars, while all cases of complete partition proved successful in preventing the



recurrence of low-level violence, producing a chi-square of 9.24, with a *p*-value of 0.01; again, three cells have expected counts of less than 5.00.

These figures strongly support the position of scholars who advocate partition. Complete partitions that separated warring ethnic groups prevented a return to war for at least five years. For the period under review, complete partition was a sufficient condition. Partitions that separated warring ethnic groups have also terminated low-level violence for at least five years. This, too, was a sufficient condition. This finding is all the more significant given that a majority of post-civil war countries continue to experience low-level violence, a plague that haunts civilian populations for years after combat operations formally conclude.

This study's results suggest that partition should be considered by policymakers under certain conditions. This is particularly relevant to postindependence Kosovo as well as to considerations to partition Iraq.

### *Policy Implications*

If the international community wants to end ethnic civil wars but it is not prepared or not able to invest the long-term resources necessary to achieve this militarily, then partition may be an option. Partition should be considered, however, only where populations are already largely separated at the time of intervention, or where interveners are prepared to separate groups using mass population transfers. If neither of these conditions holds, partition will provide no increased protection against war recurrence or other forms of violence. The saliency of this point is evident in debates over Kosovo's final status. Post-1999 Kosovo is an example of an incomplete partition, and based on the results here, a final status agreement that does not transfer Serb-controlled regions (or Serbs themselves) back to Serbia will not provide the much-desired peace dividend offered by complete partition.<sup>83</sup> Indeed, in spite of the presence of international peacekeepers, clashes in 2004 led to large-scale interethnic violence and the ethnic cleansing of Serb villages.<sup>84</sup> Therefore, despite Kosovo's declared independence, the international community should give serious consid-

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83. Because the objective is to minimize human suffering, population transfers should be kept to a minimum, which would suggest redrawing borders around the concentrated Serb populations in the north of Kosovo. The other Serb enclaves could be given the option to move, but their small size would not significantly influence the PEHI, leaving Kosovo as a complete partition.

84. The events of March 2004 led to widespread violence, death, and the "ethnic cleansing of entire minority villages and neighbourhoods." See International Crisis Group, "Collapse in Kosovo," Europe Report, No. 155 (Brussels: International Crisis Group, April 22, 2004).

eration to the further partitioning of Kosovo into homogeneous Serb and Albanian regions before withdrawal.<sup>85</sup> As it is, the northern, Serb-dominated region effectively controls its own affairs, and does not recognize the authority of Priština.<sup>86</sup>

Regarding Iraq, my results may appear to support calls for partitioning the country, especially given the large amount of communal unmixing that has already taken place. The accelerating speed with which religious targeting and displacement occurred between 2005 and 2007 strongly suggested the emergence of a security dilemma between the Shiite and Sunni communities, where families whose homes were in the “wrong” area were threatened with death if they did not leave.<sup>87</sup> The question faced by the international community, and the United States in particular, is whether to permit this separation to be organized by unregulated communal militias under conditions of large-scale violence, or whether to facilitate this process under less inhumane conditions through organized population transfers.

Implementation of a partition strategy, however, would face huge challenges given the conditions in Iraq, and would likely worsen the situation for civilians. Although the data from my study suggest that partitioning Iraq along communal lines would have a strong chance of creating a lasting peace within the Shiite-Sunni conflict,<sup>88</sup> Iraq is not divided into homogeneous regions, despite claims to the contrary.<sup>89</sup> There are large geographical regions of the country that are relatively homogeneous, but there are nevertheless several densely populated, multiethnic regions in the center of the country that would need to be demographically separated under any partition plan, not to mention multiethnic flash-point cities elsewhere in the country, such as Kirkuk.<sup>90</sup> How to accomplish this in a way that protects civilian lives would be a major challenge.

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85. Proposals for such a further partition were floated in the summer and autumn of 2007 among European states. See Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Dutch Minister Says Partition of Kosova Acceptable”; and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Russia Rules Out Crossing ‘Red Line’ on Kosova, but Would Accept Partition.”

86. Bilefsky, “In a Divided Kosovo City, a Resounding Vow to Remain Part of Serbia.”

87. Kaufmann, “Separating Iraqis, Saving Iraq”; Patrick Cockburn, “Iraq Is Disintegrating as Ethnic Cleansing Takes Hold,” *Independent*, May 20, 2006; Kathleen Ridolfo, “Iraq: Displacement Crisis Worsened by Violence,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, April 21, 2006; and the special issue of *Forced Migration Review*, “Iraq’s Displacement Crisis: The Search for Solutions,” June 2007.

88. Most analysts agree that at least three different civil wars were ongoing in Iraq in 2007; partition relates only to the intercommunal war.

89. Peter W. Galbraith states, “The case for the partition of Iraq is straightforward: It has already happened.” Galbraith, “The Case for Dividing Iraq,” *Time*, November 5, 2006, <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1555130,00.html>. More generally, there is a lack of solid information about the degree of homogenization that has occurred. On the trouble reporting even body counts in the war, see Clark Hoyt, “The Reality in Iraq? Depends on Who’s Counting,” *New York Times*, October 7, 2007.

90. The Iraqi Red Crescent and the International Organization on Migration show a complicated

Because partition without the separation of ethnic groups does not increase the likelihood of securing peace, population transfers become necessary. This poses at least two problems. First, the implementation of such transfers may sound procedural, but the reality would be far from it. Let us imagine, for example, that considerable numbers of minority group members refuse to move to their new home state. Would the U.S. military be prepared to use force to deport those civilians, the very civilians that partition is supposed to protect? Unmixing populations can require great force, as the twentieth century demonstrated. One solution to that problem is to keep transfers “voluntary,” where civilians are given the choice to move to “their” new state or remain a minority within the other group’s new state. Given the uncertainty of life under a new state dominated by an enemy group following intense warfare, most members of the minority group would likely move.<sup>91</sup> If such “voluntary” transfers do not materialize, then U.S. military force against civilians would become necessary. If the United States is not prepared to use deliberate force against Iraqi civilians, then partition should not be considered.

A second, more troubling difficulty for the situation in Iraq is that partition advocates call for international interventions when a long-term commitment of troops is not forthcoming, and this is decidedly not the situation in Iraq. U.S. and other coalition forces have had a huge military presence in Iraq for years and, if anything, have demonstrated their inability to ensure even basic security for many Iraqi civilians, especially in central regions of the country. Any announcement of a decision to partition the country would almost certainly lead to a large increase in the number of families in mixed regions seeking refuge in “their” new states, emboldening local militias that are pressing for separation. While U.S. and Iraqi forces could attempt to minimize the violence that such a mass migration might encounter, the ability of the military to ensure the safety of hundreds of thousands of Iraqis on the move, given the difficulty in providing even basic security, is highly questionable.<sup>92</sup> In this case,

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picture. As journalists James Glanz and Alissa J. Rubin stated in September 2007 after reading those organizations’ reports, “Displacement in the most populous and mixed areas is surprisingly complex, suggesting that partitioning the country into semiautonomous Sunni, Shiite, and Kurdish enclaves would not be easy.” Glanz and Rubin, “Future Look of Iraq Complicated by Internal Migration,” *New York Times*, September 19, 2007. On Kirkuk, see, for example, International Crisis Group, “Iraq and the Kurds: Resolving the Kirkuk Crisis,” Middle East Report, No. 64 (Brussels: International Crisis Group, April 19, 2007).

91. Kaufmann advocates voluntary transfers for Iraq. See Kaufmann, “Separating Iraqis, Saving Iraq.”

92. Kaufmann has suggested that some militias may support the transfers, thus reducing the burden on Iraqi and U.S. forces, but this is far from certain given the large number of actors involved. He has also pointed out that some militias might oppose the transfers. *Ibid.*, p. 159.

the decision to partition could make the situation considerably worse for civilians, thus taking away the humanitarian rationale of partition advocates.

Partition could also be considered for other ethnic civil wars, such as Sri Lanka's war with Tamil separatists, Sudan's war in Darfur, and the Philippines' war against Moro separatists. The key is to consider this as a solution only where borders can be drawn around relatively homogeneous groups, or where an intervener can be sure that population transfers will occur under less inhumane conditions than the war itself produces. As I stated above, this latter condition may be too difficult to achieve in practice, suggesting partition simply may not be viable in some cases.

### *Conclusion*

This article has examined partition as a way to prevent the recurrence of ethnic war and low-level violence. After reviewing theoretical issues involving the dynamics of ethnic war, I reexamined the first large-scale, cross-national empirical study of partition conducted by Nicholas Sambanis. Sambanis relied on the presence of a new political border as his indicator for partition, concluding that partition does not significantly prevent war recurrence and should not be promoted by the international community. Using the Sambanis data set, I tested the variable suggested by partition advocates—demographic separation—for all partitions that ended ethnic civil wars between 1945 and 2004. Introducing a new index to evaluate ethnodemographic separation, the Postpartition Ethnic Homogeneity Index, I reanalyzed these partitions and found that in all cases where the PEHI showed a complete separation of warring minorities, there were no war recurrences and no occurrences of low-level violence for at least five years after the end of the ethnic civil war. These results trump the alternatives of incomplete partitions and no partitions, providing strong evidence for advocates of partition.

I considered some of the policy implications of the results of this study for countries experiencing ethnic warfare today and in the recent past, in particular Kosovo and Iraq. I concluded that partition should be considered in ethnic civil wars only where populations are already separated demographically or where the intervener is able to implement population transfers safely. This suggests that partitioning Kosovo into majority Serb and Albanian districts may have long-term benefits for regional peace. Partitioning Iraq, however, given its highly populated, multiethnic regions, would likely increase the level of conflict and human suffering, and therefore may not be a viable option.

This study suggests some promising areas for future research. First, the

PEHI could be extended to incorporate not only the presence of minorities, but also their location and territorial concentration after partition. Several scholars have identified group concentration as a powerful predictor of rebellion, and Barry Posen has argued that the location of minorities may increase the security dilemma risk.<sup>93</sup> For example, minorities living near a state's borders might increase the likelihood of renewed violence. Second, the frequency of militarized interstate disputes among postpartitioned states could be compared with that in all other states to see if these new dyads are more or less at risk of interstate warfare. Third, an examination of ethnic reintegration after ethnic war could be made to test partition advocates' claims that reintegration after war is either impossible or likely to lead to renewed conflict. Although all wars produce high levels of displacement, the degree to which displaced populations return, even after ethnic cleansing, is surprisingly variable both across cases and temporally in the years following the end of ethnic wars. Many in the international community are normatively committed to the idea of multiethnic societies and yet are confounded by the realities of protracted refugee problems and intransigent postwar communities long after the war has ended. Does lack of reintegration stem from a top-down process led by political elites, or a bottom-up process led by local communities? Do returns increase or decrease the risk of war and violence? Answers to these questions are not only of great theoretical interest but extreme practical value.

### *Appendix: Statistical Examination of the PEHI*

I added the PEHI to the Sambanis data set to check for significance on war recurrence. Using binary probit analysis, I regressed the variable *warend2* (no war recurrence for at least two years after the end of the civil war) on the continuous variable PEHI only for ethnic wars that experienced partition. The PEHI is affected by the prewar minority percentages; as a control, therefore, the prewar minority variable has also been included in the model. The results show a positive regression coefficient for the PEHI, as one would expect based on the theory, with a *p*-value significant at the 0.1 level (see Table 1).

The results suggest that the greater the separation of warring minorities produced by a partition (i.e., the higher the PEHI), the greater the expected likeli-

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93. See, for example, Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict"; Toft, *The Geography of Ethnic Violence*; and Gurr, *Minorities at Risk*.

Table 1. Probit Results for No War Recurrence after Two Years

Variable	$\beta$	z-value	$p >  z $
Postpartition Ethnic Homogeneity Index	0.01	1.56	0.06
Prewar minority	-0.03	-0.91	0.18
Constant	0.93	1.35	0.09

NOTE:  $N = 17$ .  $\beta$  is an unstandardized coefficient;  $z$  is a z-test of  $\beta$ ; and  $p$  is the  $p$ -value for a one-tailed z-test.

hood is of not experiencing a return to war for at least two years. Given the small  $n$  (17), however, these results are only suggestive. It should also be noted that if any other control variables are entered into the probit analysis, all results become insignificant; this is almost certainly due to the small  $n$ .